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The article discusses the regulation of public space with specific reference to municipal by-laws. It focuses on the
case of municipal “ordinances” in Italy. The basic features of the municipal by-laws will be described, and their appli-
cation in recent years will be analysed. This will be followed by a critique of their particular implications concerning
the use of space, with emphasis on the issue of regulating behaviour in public spaces on the basis of substantive
conceptions of the “good”, and on the intrinsic limitations of municipal by-laws as applied in Italy.
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municipal regulations1
Local governments have always regulated urban life
through the application of local regulations. Neverthe-
less, as Valverde (2005) has pointed out, studies on the
relations between local by-laws and space are relatively
recent in urban studies: the first works appeared in the
mid-1990s and focused in particular on a series of mea-
sures applied in the United States and Canada2 in order
to curb cases of so-called “street disorder” (begging,
vagrancy, etc.).3 The issue is not limited to North America,
however: albeit with different qualitative and quantitative
features, the phenomenon occurs in certain European
countries as well (Doherty et al. 2008; Wacquant, 2001;
Ambrosini, 2013; Recasens et al. 2013). In this regard,
developments are particularly interesting in Italy, where
instances of policing city life through municipal regula-
tions – and more specifically by means of the so-called
“ordinanza municipale [municipal ordinance]” – have
increased significantly in recent years: “In Italy … there is
a proliferation of ordinances, often arbitrary if not trivial,
by some municipalities” (Recasens et al. 2013, p. 374).
The impact of these measures can be far-reaching. For
instance, as regards the control of public space, the
regulation of access and behaviour can hugely condition
the way in which people live in their cities and enjoy* Correspondence: stefano.moroni@polimi.it
1Department of Architecture and Urban Studies, Milan Polytechnic,
via Bonardi 3 - 20133, Milano, Italy
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2014 Moroni and Chiodelli; licensee Springe
Commons Attribution License (http://creativeco
reproduction in any medium, provided the origthem. It may do so, for example, by excluding or imped-
ing particular “undesired” groups or lifestyles (Chiodelli
and Moroni 2013). In fact, public spaces are funda-
mental nexuses of urban life (Gehl, 1996; Madanipour,
2003 and Madanipour 2010; Mitchell, 2003; Staeheli and
Mitchell, 2008; Carmona et al. 2010). Hence, how their
use is regulated is crucial – and not just how they are
actually designed. Note also that, in most cases, munici-
pal ordinances tend to have specific features that distin-
guish them from other forms of regulation of social life
(such as criminal law and constitutional rights law).4
This specificity has spawned numerous debates on the
legitimacy and opportunity of such forms of regulation,
particularly in the United States and Canada (Ellickson,
1996; Teir, 1998; Waldron, 2000; Blomley, 2007). The
purpose of this article is to extend the discussion, with
particular regard to practice in Italy, which has several
notable peculiarities.2. Case description: The municipal ordinance in Italy
2.1. Definition and characteristics of the instrument
The municipal ordinance first appeared in Italy in the
mid-1800s as a measure devised essentially to tackle un-
expected and grave situations requiring an immediate
response and not otherwise covered by ordinary regula-
tory measures. Take for example the response to cata-
strophic events, such as floods or earthquakes, and the
related need promptly to block access to the areas af-
fected or transit within them.5 Given the urgency of the
situations with which ordinances are intended to deal,r. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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therefore not subject to the standard deliberative proce-
dures (e.g., a ruling by the local council), nor to debate
and the relative voting procedure. For this reasons they
are atypical in nature.
Traditionally, in Italy these ordinances presuppose
four principal factors: (i) urgency and necessity (they deal
with urgent problems not covered by ordinary regulatory
measures); (ii) contingency (they tackle extraordinary and
unforeseeable situations); (iii) temporaneity (their appli-
cation has a limited time-scale, and after a certain period
things revert to normal); (iv) proportionality (they pur-
sue the public interest with the least possible sacrifice of
private interest) (Vandelli, 2008; Razzano, 2008).
With the modifications introduced in Italy by Decree
no. 92 of 2008 on “urgent measures in the field of public
security” – namely the Pacchetto Sicurezza [security pack-
age], converted into Law no. 125 of 2008 – the ordinance
assumed new functions and characteristics.
Firstly, there was an increase in the areas in which ordi-
nances might be employed. Notably, their use was ex-
tended to the field of urban safety and security. Ordinances
may thus now apply, for example, to all situations that al-
legedly favour crime; or those that impede circulation, or
detract from the city’s “image”, such as vagrancy, prostitu-
tion or begging: in short, behaviour that allegedly disturbs
or annoys citizens. In fact, the Ministerial Decree defines
the concept of urban security “very vaguely, as a public
good that has to be defended at local level through the im-
provement of civic rules, and with the aim of improving
living conditions in urban centres and strengthening social
cohesion” (Recasens et al. 2013, p. 371).
Secondly, since Decree no. 92 an ordinance can be ap-
plied in a manner no longer determined by contingent
and urgent factors. Furthermore, the requisite limited
timescale has also disappeared.
2.2. Diffusion and application
Under the powers granted to them by Decree no. 92 of
2008, the mayors of many Italian towns have used ordi-
nances as the standard means to regulate behaviour in
public spaces, largely justifying their decisions on the
basis of concerns for public decorum and safety.
A census carried out by the national survey group
Cittalia – Fondazione ANCI ricerche (2009) covering Au-
gust 2008 to August 2009 documented 788 ordinances on
matters of urban security adopted by 445 municipalities.6
In 56% of the cases, these ordinances involved small to
medium-sized cities (with between 5,000 and 50,000
inhabitants).
Of the ordinances documented, 69% were applied in
the north of Italy, 11% in central Italy, 12% in the south,
and 8% in the islands.7 Lombardy was the region with
the greatest number of councils that resorted to thisregulating device (127 separate councils, totalling 237
ordinances). But in percentage terms, the Veneto, Emilia
Romagna, and Tuscany regions are those with the lar-
gest number of councils issuing ordinances.
The areas to which these ordinances applied were in par-
ticular: consumption of alcoholic beverages (13.6%), prosti-
tution (13%), vandalism or damage to public or private
property (9.4%), serving food and/or beverages (8%), rub-
bish dumping (7.6%), begging (7.4%), noise (6%), camping
(6%). As regards those affected by the ordinances, 68% ap-
plied to the entire population; 15% to a specific “category”
(such as shop-owners); and 17% to specific “subjects”.
Regarding the types of territory affected, in 60% of cases
the ordinance applied to the council’s entire jurisdiction,
20% to generic types of spaces (e.g., all parks), 20% to par-
ticular roads or squares (e.g., road A, square B). As con-
cerns the period of validity, many ordinances do not
include a specific date of expiry.
In most cases, any violation of the ordinance entails a
fine – ranging on average between 150 and 500 euros.
Only in a few cases is a legal penalty envisaged (Cittalia –
Fondazione ANCI Ricerche 2012).
3. Discussion and evaluation: An analysis of the
spatial dimension and implications of municipal
ordinances
Since the Decree no. 92 of 2008 was issued, the use of
ordinances to regulate behaviour in public spaces has
spread throughout the country, regardless of the political
leanings of the administration involved.8 In a significant
number of cases, the ordinance is intended to advance –
either directly or indirectly – a certain idea of the “good”
(and a certain life-style), independently of actual harm to
other individuals.
One “conception of the good” is an idea of what ren-
ders life pleasant and worth living. Each individual fol-
lows a more or less precise conception of what gives
meaning to life. An individual’s conception of a good life
includes his/her main aims and goals in life, ideas on
how to spend time and money, as well as specific tastes
concerning everyday choices (Waldron, 1993). A particu-
lar life-style derives from a certain conception of the
good. In the classical liberal tradition – which we follow
here – the central idea is that the State must defend the
right of each person to pursue the conception of the
good life that he or she prefers, providing only that no
tangible harm is directly caused to others (Larmore,
1996; Rawls, 1993). In this perspective it is not harmful
to adopt a life-style that does not satisfy the desires,
preferences or tastes of others.
Conversely, as we shall see, many ordinances are in
fact targeted on certain life-styles (in themselves) and not
on tangible harms (to others). This applies, for example,
to certain ordinances concerning the consumption of
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the functioning of places of worship, prayer in public
places, the language to be used in public events and on
shop signs, expression of cultural features, leafleting,
gathering signatures, prostitution, camping, and dossing,
etc.
3.1. Ordinances applied to all the city’s public spaces
In most cases ordinances are applied to all public spaces
(within the council’s territory).
It is worth starting the discussion from a simple obser-
vation: the fact that an individual possesses a body with
physical extension requires the use of space for any type
of activity (Logan and Molotch, 1987). This fact may seem
banal, but it is hardly irrelevant to people who are in a
situation of “no-property”, namely without a private space
of their own – a home, for instance. As Jeremy Waldron
(1993), p. 313 notes, one way to describe the difficulties of
homelessness is to observe that there is no place governed
by a private property rule where the homeless are allowed
to be. The point is that all actions necessarily involve a
spatial component of some kind. If follows that someone
who is not allowed to remain anywhere is precluded from
all forms of activity, and is perforce deprived of freedom
(ibid.).9 For individuals without property, public space is
an essential element of their existence: it is the only place
in which they can perform certain vital functions (sleep,
eat, and satisfy other physiological needs).
In Italy this type of problem occurs in ordinances
(around 10% of the total) that apply to sleeping outdoors
(in the sense of dossing somewhere improvised), for ex-
ample by banning people from using sleeping-bags in
public areas, or from sleeping in their cars parked on
the street. The aim of such ordinances is usually to pre-
vent homeless people from loitering on council land.10
In short: for people in a “no-property” situation, the pro-
hibition of certain acts in public spaces is tantamount to
banning them from performing those functions at all –
when the public authority does not provide an alternative.
Consider sleeping in the street: if sleeping rough is banned
and there are no alternatives provided by the public ad-
ministration, certain categories of individuals are basically
banned from sleeping altogether. As Waldron (2000),
p. 397 writes, in the case of an individual who owns a
home, compliance with an ordinance prohibiting sleeping
in public places is merely a matter of “relocation”; but, for
an individual who has no home, compliance with this kind
of ordinance “would mean that he must not sleep (for
there is now no place where his sleeping is permissible)”.
To quote Waldron (2000), p. 394 again: If everyone in
our cities had access to private accommodation in which
to sleep, care for themselves, and so on, then public spaces
could be regulated in the following way: “Since everyone
would have access to a private home, activities deemedparticularly appropriate to the private realm – activities
like sleeping, copulating, washing, urinating and so forth –
could be confined to that realm. Public places could be
put off-limits to such activities, and dedicated instead to
activities that complemented those that citizens performed
in their own homes”. But this is not appropriate for public
spaces in a city where there are homeless people. In such a
setting, public spaces have to be regulated in light of the
recognition that some people “have no alternative but to
be and remain and live all their lives in public. For such
persons, there is an unavoidable failure of the complemen-
tarity between the use of private space and the use of pub-
lic space, and … we are simply not in a position to use that
complementarity as a basis for regulation” (ibid., p. 395).
The above objections in no way gainsay the problems
that some of the ordinances aim to tackle (e.g., the prob-
lem of homelessness). Nor are we claiming that people
should always be allowed to carry out certain activities
in public – such as sleeping in the streets or fulfilling
physiological needs. Nevertheless, in cases where there is
no viable alternative provided by the public authorities
(e.g., dormitories, camping areas, traveller camps, public
urinals, etc.), the prohibition on the entire council terri-
tory of vital behaviours is a dubious undertaking: it is
detrimental to the right to personal freedom, and in cer-
tain cases risks ratifying forms of discrimination against
“undesirable” classes of people and life-styles.
The problem is that in many cases the prohibition of
certain behaviours has paradoxically become more se-
vere in parallel with the reduction of alternatives pro-
vided by the authorities. Not long ago many Italian cities
had public urinals/washrooms; these facilities have grad-
ually disappeared while penalties for relieving oneself in
public have become harsher (as regards the US, compare
with Waldron, 2000, pp. 383-384).
To conclude, the aim of certain ordinances is to
keep homeless people out of the council’s territory.
The limitation of certain conduct in all public spaces
within a council’s jurisdiction causes a “criminalisa-
tion” of certain individuals whereby certain categories
of people are proscribed from “existing” and “func-
tioning” as human beings in that area (Mitchell, 1995
and Mitchell 1997).
A similar reasoning applies to travellers (Roma and it-
inerant Sinti). Such people have no private space of their
own, except perhaps a camper or caravan. As a conse-
quence, through ordinances of a certain kind, they too
are often barred from staying – even temporarily – on a
council’s territory.11 Likewise, ordinances that ban
begging on council territory follow a similar logic
(Rossi, 2010).12 (To be noted is that, according to
Italian law, the practice of “non-intrusive” begging
is not a crime: Constitution Court sentence no. 519
of 1995).13
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public space
Certain problems discussed in the previous section carry
less weight when the prohibitions in question apply only
to specific portions of the council’s territory, meaning
that certain functions and activities are banned from an
assigned area, but not in others.
The issue in this case is the legitimacy of establishing
different sets of rules for areas essentially of a similar na-
ture. This does not include provisions intended to address
temporary situations affecting a specific area of the city
(such as excluding traffic on the occasion of a special
event). Here the ordinance establishes a sort of permanent
sub-zoning of public space: this applies to numerous ordi-
nances banning the consumption of alcoholic beverages,
or public assemblies, or loitering in specific public areas of
Italian cities.14 A number of ordinances even restrict ac-
cess to certain public spaces on the basis of age, residential
address, or number of people in the gathering.15
If the aim is effectively the one usually cited – namely
to prevent littering or breach of the “peace” – then to
our mind there is no justification for applying such rules
and bans only to specific areas of the city. This selective
application encourages a division of the city into some
zones in which certain normal activities are allowed and
others in which they are prohibited. The upshot is that
the average citizen’s understanding of what is permitted
and what not is fragmented, particularly when there are
rarely clear indications (e.g. street signage) of the rules
applying to the area in question.164. Conclusions
4.1. Urban space and life-styles
Many of the ordinances lay down rules on access to, and
behaviour in, public spaces for general and generic use,
such as streets, pavements, plazas, and so forth. These
spaces can be termed “stricto sensu public spaces”.17
Stricto sensu public spaces are those whose “publicness” is
paramount by definition, so that any possible limitation is
kept to an absolute minimum, and tolerance (i.e. the wid-
est possible expression of plurality and respect for individ-
ual lifestyles: McKinnon, 2006; Walzer, 1997) to a
maximum. In such places all access and behaviour should
be tolerated, irrespective of their content, provided that
they are not detrimental to the public nature of the space
in question.
It is consequently crucial to identify what possible
side-effects arising from certain activities might be con-
sidered detrimental to the use of public spaces. Debate
on this intricate and complex issue is currently ongoing.
Nonetheless, we accept two points that are closely inter-
related: first, specific conceptions of the good life should
not in themselves be the presuppositions for particularregulations (Moroni, 2012a and Moroni 2012b); second,
the behaviour regulated should be the cause of evident
negative external effects, namely direct and tangible
forms of harm (Moroni, 2011). In brief, public regulation
must acknowledge, and facilitate, the many different life-
styles that exist.
Yet some ordinances seem to regulate both access to,
and action in, stricto sensu public spaces according to spe-
cific conceptions of the good life. They regulate behav-
iours which as such do not generate any noticeable
negative externalities. Instead of trying to deflect possible
harmful effects, in most of these situations the ordinance
targets behaviours deemed unacceptable in themselves.
The true purposes of such ordinances are therefore to hin-
der certain types of groups from converging on council
territory, and to impede certain life-styles.
4.2. Problems (substantive and procedural)
As we have seen, in Italy in recent years municipal ordi-
nances have been widely adopted as standard tools with
which to regulate behaviour in public spaces, and they
have often been applied excessively, and at times
bizarrely.18 In many cases, this kind of application has
generated two types of problems.
The first concerns “procedure”. Here we have a tool – the
municipal ordinance – devised as an extraordinary and
emergency measure (and consequently issued through may-
oral fiat without passing through the customary municipal
decision-making procedures) being used instead as a means
to establish ordinary regulations. This issue becomes even
more serious when such measures are adopted for crucial
questions that raise issues of tolerance: as an act that carries
the mayor’s authority, the ordinance per se hardly seems a
suitable means with which to address such delicate issues,
which would surely require wider debate within the trad-
itional (elected) decision-making bodies.19 Indeed, from a
constitutional standpoint, in Italy the municipal ordinance
cannot introduce further – or diverse – prohibitions not
already covered by the law (Corvaja 2010).20 To accept
otherwise would be tantamount to granting the mayor the
power “to please himself”, which would certainly clash with
the very essence of the rule of law (Moroni, 2007).
The second problem is one of “substance”. As outlined
above, in some instances the regulation of public spaces
is not applied to prevent possible negative side-effects,
but on the basis of substantive conceptions of the good
life: in certain cases, the aim is deliberately to block or
hamper the presence on council land of specific types of
people – and their life-styles – deemed undesirable
(Roma, homeless people, members of some religion,
etc.).21 Similarly, in some cases attempts are made to
condition the use of public space according to the belief
that one type of life-style is better than another. Any
such pre-emptive application clashes with the traditional
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the purpose of such public regulation does not seem to be
prevention of the negative effects of the actions of individ-
uals in order to safeguard the freedoms of everyone; but
rather expressly to promote certain lifestyles over others
(Corvaja, 2010). It should be made clear that we are not
advocating some naïve idea of totally open access to public
space: any type of public space is characterised by some
form of regulation of access to and behaviour within it
(Chiodelli and Moroni, 2014). The problem lies in the con-
tents of such regulations, and in their justification.
4.3. Perspectives
On 4 April 2011, with ruling no. 115, the Italian Consti-
tutional Court22 declared unconstitutional the modifica-
tions introduced by Decree no. 92 of 2008 regarding the
ordinary use of ordinances. The court declared that, in
terms of their end-goals (public welfare and urban secur-
ity) and targets (the persons present on a given terri-
tory), ordinances impinge on the general sphere of
freedom of the individual. Although they are intended to
safeguard important public assets, they impose severe
restrictions on the persons concerned: and the Italian
Constitution, based as it is on the fundamental princi-
ples of legality and democracy, states that no duty,
whether personal or public, may be imposed unless
backed by the law. It should be pointed out that a fur-
ther issue underscored in the Constitutional Court’s rul-
ing concerns the unconstitutionality of applying different
norms to different parts of the Italian territory, thereby
giving rise to excessive disparity of treatment among citi-
zens. The Court also emphasised the scant knowability
and comprehensibility of ordinances.
The case is not closed, however (Manfredi 2012):23
despite the above ruling no. 115, various mayors have
expressed their intent to return to the previous wider ap-
plication of ordinances. This intent has also been
expressed by some national political parties. Meanwhile a
trend is emerging whereby the contents of those ordi-
nances rejected by the constitutional ruling are being
transferred to the traditional local regulations (e.g., build-
ing and land-use regulations, sanitary regulations).24
While this might resolve some of the procedural hurdles
indicated above (the introduction of these regulations fol-
low ordinary procedures), it would not address our cited
perplexities about their substance (in particular, the prob-
lem of the excessive and unjustified prescription in terms
of conceptions of the good life).25
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24See Cittalia – Fondazione ANCI Ricerche (2012); in
reference to the restrictive regulations on ethnic restau-
rants, see Magrassi (2010).
25For an in-depth discussion of the problem as tackled
in other countries, see Beatley (1994, pp. 211–226).
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